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**BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS  
AND INTERFERENCES**

Application Number: 10/656,274  
Filing Date: September 08, 2003  
Appellant(s): KATO, YOSHIKAZU

Mr. Bradley D. Lytle and Mr. James Love  
For Appellant

**EXAMINER'S ANSWER**

This is in response to the appeal brief filed 11 November 2009 appealing from the Office action mailed 04 August 2009.

**(1) Real Party in Interest**

A statement identifying by name the real party in interest is contained in the brief.

**(2) Related Appeals and Interferences**

The examiner is not aware of any related appeals, interferences, or judicial proceedings which will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the pending appeal.

**(3) Status of Claims**

The statement of the status of claims contained in the brief is correct.

**(4) Status of Amendments After Final**

The Appellant's statement of the status of amendments after final rejection contained in the brief is correct.

**(5) Summary of Claimed Subject Matter**

The summary of claimed subject matter contained in the brief is correct.

**(6) Grounds of Rejection to be Reviewed on Appeal**

The Appellant's statement of the grounds of rejection to be reviewed on appeal is substantially correct. The changes are as follows: a new ground of rejection has been added.

**New Grounds Rejection**

**Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112, Second Paragraph**

Claims 1-3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicant regards as the invention.

**Regarding Claims 1-3**

The following claim elements are means-plus function limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph (see analysis below):

The “ordering means for receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre” of claim 1;

The “managing means for managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre” of claim 1;

The “reading means for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction” of claim 1;

The “arranging means for arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means” of claim 1; and

The “composing means for composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display” of claim 1.

However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for the claimed function. The Examiner has carefully searched the original specification and cannot determine the structure performing the recited functions.

The Examiner finds that because particular claims are rejected as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, it is impossible to properly construe claim scope at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though the claims are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*.

#### **(7) Claims Appendix**

The copy of the appealed claims contained in the Appendix to the brief is correct.

#### **(8) Evidence Relied Upon**

##### **Patents (or PGPubs):**

2002/0040374 A1	Kent	04 April 2002
2002/0065730 A1	Nii	30 May 2002

##### **Non-Patent Literature:**

White, "How Computers Work," Millennium Edition, 1999, Que Corporation, Indianapolis, IN, chapter 14.

#### **(9) Grounds of Rejection**

The following grounds of rejection are applicable to the appealed claims:

##### ***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101***

35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

Claims 1-3 and 7-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

##### **Regarding Claims 1 and 7**

Claims 1 and 7 recite computer programs *per se*. "Computer programs claimed as computer listings per se, *i.e.*, the descriptions or expressions of the programs, are not physical 'things.' They are neither computer components nor statutory processes, as they are not 'acts' being performed." MPEP §2106.01 I. Because claims 1 and 7 recite only abstractions that are neither "things" nor "acts," the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of

invention<sup>1</sup>. Because the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of invention, the claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101.

Additionally, Applicant's original specification expressly states “[t]he series of steps described above may be executed by suitably functioning hardware or by software.” Because of the “or” in “hardware *or* by software” (emphasis added), the specification supports an embodiment of the claimed invention to be software alone. See original specification, p. 31, last line – p. 32, first line. Moreover, “A claim that covers both statutory and non-statutory embodiments (under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim when read in light of the specification and in view of one skilled in the art) embraces subject matter that is not eligible for patent protection and therefore is directed to non-statutory subject matter.” For additional guidance, see USPTO Memorandum<sup>2</sup> by Acting Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy Hirshfeld, Andrew H. titled Effective Today: New Interim Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Examination Instructions, August 24, 2009<sup>3</sup>

Because the claimed “means” and “unit[s]” may be interpreted as software *per se*, the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of invention and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101.

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<sup>1</sup>35 U.S.C. §101 defines four categories of inventions that Congress deemed to be the appropriate subject matter of a patent; namely, processes, machines, manufactures, and composition of matter. The latter three categories define “things” (or products) while the first category defines “actions” (*i.e.*, inventions that consist of a series of steps or acts to be performed).

<sup>2</sup> Available on the USPTO Internet at <http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/memoranda.jsp>

<sup>3</sup> See MPEP §707.06 “Citation of Decisions, Orders Memorandums, and Notices” expressly authorizing the Examiner to cite to Commissioner’s Memorandums which have not yet been incorporated into the MPEP.

Alternatively, the Examiner notes that using the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unit,” as provided in the Office action mailed on 18 March 2009 (p. 13, ¶ 27dd), the claimed “unit[s]” are interpreted as software only. Because the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unit” includes software *per se*, the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of invention and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101.

Claims 2 and 3, which depend from claim 1, and claims 8 and 9, which depend from claim 7, are rejected for the same reasons as above.

**New Grounds Rejection**

**Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112, Second Paragraph**

Claims 1-3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicant regards as the invention.

**Regarding Claims 1-3**

The following claim elements are means-plus function limitations that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph (see analysis below):

The “ordering means for receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre” of claim 1;

The “managing means for managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre” of claim 1;

The “reading means for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction” of claim 1;

The “arranging means for arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means” of claim 1; and

The “composing means for composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display” of claim 1.

However, the written description fails to disclose the corresponding structure, material, or acts for the claimed function. The Examiner has carefully searched the original specification and cannot determine the structure performing the recited functions.

The Examiner finds that because particular claims are rejected as being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, it is impossible to properly construe claim scope at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though the claims are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103***

Claims 1, 3-5, 7, and 9, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Kent (U.S. 2002/0040374 A1) ("Kent"), in view of Nii (U.S. 2002/0065730 A1) ("Nii").

Regarding Claims 1, 4, 5, and 7

Kent discloses the limitations:

ordering means (server **13**) for receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre (¶ 0035 and 0048);

storing means (content database **160**) for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order (¶ 0079);

managing means (software program **100**) for managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on previous orders (¶ 0062 and 0065-0068);

reading means (optimization program **48**) for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction (¶ 0079);

arranging means (profiling program **132**) for arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means (¶ 0079); and

composing means ("printer") for composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display (¶ 0083).

Kent also discloses orders corresponding to a genre (¶ 0048 and 0054).

Kent does not directly disclose a means “by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre,” as recited in the claims.

Nii, however, discloses a method of and a system for distributing electronic content. In Nii’s method and system, Nii teaches “a tailoring parameters register” by which to determine preferences (“tailorization parameters”) based on a quantity of previous orders (“list of previous items purchased”), each order corresponding to a genre (¶¶ 0024, 0027, 0072, 0075, and 0079).

In Nii the preferences are used for “tailorization of the content to be delivered on a terminal per terminal basis,” where “information to be delivered to that particular terminal is tailored in accordance with the preferences, settings, etc.”

This ability of Nii demonstrates the ability of one of ordinary skill in the art to apply these teachings to similar systems, such as the system of Kent.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made to include the functionality of Nii’s system (*i.e.*, determining preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre) in the managing means of Kent (*i.e.*, software program **100**) since the claimed invention is merely a combination of old elements, and in the combination each element merely would have performed the same function as it did separately, and one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the results of the combination were predictable.

#### Regarding Claims 3 and 9

The combination of Kent and Nii discloses the limitations of claim 1, as shown above, and further discloses the limitations:

wherein said plurality of content data include at least information for distinguishing said plurality of content data from other content data and information for indicating where said plurality of content data are stored in said storing means (Kent, ¶¶ 0079 and 0099-0100).

Claims 2 and 8, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Kent and Nii, in further view of Applicant's Own Admission ("AOA") (see "Response to Arguments," OA mailed on 04 August 2009, ¶¶ 56 and 57).

Regarding Claims 2 and 8

The combination of Kent and Nii discloses the limitations of claim 1, as shown above, and further discloses the limitations:

wherein said managing means determines said genre of said content data read by said reading means (¶¶ 0065-0068: program **100** chooses relevant articles based on criteria, here the type of article must be determined; see also ¶ 0061: program **48** ensures content matches user's interests; ¶ 0078: prioritizing content based on user interests; and ¶¶ 0077 and 0079: program **48** and program **132** choose content that best relates to user profile).

The combination of Kent and Nii does not directly disclose the managing means associates the number of times that the plurality of content data belonging to said genre have been read with information for identifying a user for management purposes.

However, Applicant admits that metering content usage on a per use basis and associating the use with an identifier of a user is old and well-known in the art because this method reduces the cost to a user who may only want to use the content once.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the invention was made, to modify the managing means of Kent and Nii with the old and well-known metering method. One would have been motivated to do so because this would provide a convenience to the user and lower costs to access content.

### ***New Ground Of Rejection***

Claims 7 and 8 are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which Applicant regards as the invention. In this alternative rejection, claim 7 is indefinite because it is considered a hybrid claim and therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph. See MPEP §2173.05(p) II.

In the 2009 Appeal Brief at page 7 Appellants state:

With regard to Claim 7, Applicants note that this claim is directed to an information processing apparatus which includes at least a management unit implemented using a central processing unit. Applicants note that this claim cannot be asserted as being software *per se* as the claim expressly recites that the management unit is implemented using a CPU. The outstanding Action asserts on page 14, in item 45, that "while a "central processing unit" may be interpreted as hardware, the central processing unit is not positively recited in the claim. Accordingly, the claim is interpreted as software *per se*. If the "using a central processing unit" was considered positively recited and because the term "using," the claim would be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 2nd paragraph because the claim would be a hybrid claim. See MPEP §2173.05(p) II."

In response, Applicants note that the central processing unit recited in Claim 7 is clearly positively recited. Asserting that this feature is not positively recited is unsupportable by the facts in question. Moreover, the assertion that the

claim would be a hybrid claim also is completely unsupportable. The phrase "a management unit implemented using a central processing unit" is not an attempt to claim a process without setting forth any steps as is discussed in MPEP 8217.05(D), such an assertion is not supportable by applicable law.

First, it is the Examiner's principle position that claim 7 is not a hybrid claim because the phrase "implemented using a central processing unit" only characterizes the *execution* of the claimed "management unit," *i.e.*, the phrase "implemented using a central processing unit" is not a positively recited action of the "apparatus" of claim 7, it only characterizes the implementation (or future *execution*) of the "management unit," thus not requiring the "central processing unit" as an element of the claim. In other words, for direct infringement, only the importation or creation of the "management unit" is required and not a the step or action of implementation *using* a central processing unit. Therefore, the "central processing unit" is outside of the scope of the "apparatus" of claim 7.

For true product claims, how the claimed element is used is immaterial to the patentability of the claimed product. See MPEP §2114, section titled "Manner of Operating the Device Does Not Differentiate Apparatus Claim from the Prior Art" noting that

A claim containing a "recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus" if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim.

MPEP §2114.

Thus, the law is clear that for a true product claim, the patentability of a product claim is based upon structure, not how the structure is implemented or used. From this rational, the claimed "implemented using a central processing unit" can not be considered a positive limitation.

Under this principle position, because the phrase “implemented using a central processing unit” does not positively recite an action of the claimed “apparatus,” and hence does not require the “central processing unit” as a claim element, the Board should reverse the 112, second paragraph Hybrid claim rejection but maintain the 35 U.S.C. §101 rejection.

**Alternatively**, if the Board finds that the phrase “implemented using a central processing unit” ***does*** positively recite an action of the claimed “apparatus” (*i.e.*, positively recites ‘using a [CPU]’), the Board should maintain this (new) 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph Hybrid claim rejection but reverse the 35 U.S.C. §101 rejection. Under this alternative interpretation, the claim requires “using a central processing unit.”

Claim 7 is indefinite because it is considered a hybrid claim. See MPEP §2173.05(p) II. In particular, claim 7 is directed to neither a “process” or a “machine” but rather embraces or overlaps two different statutory classes of invention as set forth in 35 U.S.C. §101.

For example, claim 7 recites “[a]n information processing apparatus” and “a management unit....” Additionally, claim 8 recites “[a]n information processing apparatus according to claim 7....” In light of this evidence, one of ordinary skill in the art could reasonably interpret these recitations as express intent by Applicant to claim a machine claim. Alternatively, claim 7 recites “a management unit implemented *using* a central processing unit...” (emphasis added). One of ordinary skill in the art could also reasonably interpret these recitations as express intent by Applicant to claim a process claim. In light of this conflicting evidence, a person of ordinary skill in the art could reasonably interpret claim 7 to be drawn to either a product or process.

Therefore in accordance with §2173.05(p) II which states that a single claim must be drawn to either a product or process (but not both) and because a potential competitor of

Applicant would not know whether *possession alone* of the claimed structure constituted infringement, or alternatively, if infringement required the *execution* of the recited method steps, the claims are indefinite.

In *IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 430 F.3d 1377, 77 USPQ2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the Federal Circuit invalidated dependent claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph because it was considered a hybrid claim (*i.e.* it recited both a product claim (the system) and a method for using that system). Claim 25 in *IPXL Holdings* read:

*The system of claim 2 [including an input means] wherein the predicted transaction information comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associated with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to either change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction type and transaction parameters.* [Emphasis in original].

*IPXL Holdings*, 77 USPQ at 1145 (citations omitted).

To support its position that the claim was indefinite, the court stated:

Thus, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one *creates* a system that allows the user to change the predicted transaction information or accept the displayed transaction, *or* [alternatively] whether infringement occurs when the user *actually uses* the input means to change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a displayed transaction. Because claim 25 recites both a system and the method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section 112, paragraph 2. [Emphasis added].

*IPXL Holdings*, 77 USPQ at 1145 (citations omitted).

Applying *IPXL Holdings* to this application, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 7 occurs when one *creates* the information processing apparatus having the claimed structure, *or* alternatively, whether infringement occurs when the management unit *actual uses* the central processing unit.

In this application and as noted on page 7 of the 2009 Appeal Brief, Appellants were

given ***actual notice*** that should they continue their arguments that the management unit is implemented with a CPU, a hybrid claim rejection would be set forth. Because Appellants have maintained their argument that the management unit is ***using*** a CPU, the Examiner has provided this new, alternative grounds of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.

### ***Claim Interpretation***

#### **35 U.S.C. 112, Sixth Paragraph**

##### **Means Phrase #1**

##### ***Invocation***

It is the Examiner's position that in claim 1, the phrase "ordering means for receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre" ("Means Phrase #1" or "MP#1") is an attempt by Appellant to invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

##### **Invocation Step 1:**

First, in accordance with the MPEP §2181, the *Supplemental Examination Guidelines for Determining the Applicability of 35 USC 112 6¶* ("Guidelines")<sup>4</sup>, and *AI-Site Corp. v. VSI International Inc.*, 174 F.3d. 1308, 1318, 50 USPQ2d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1999),<sup>5</sup> Appellant's use of "means for" in claim 1 creates a rebuttable presumption that tends to invoke

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<sup>4</sup> Federal Register Vol. 65, No. 120, June 21, 2000.

<sup>5</sup> See also *Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Industry, Inc.*, 126 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 USPQ2d 1103, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.*, 91 F.3d 1580, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1783, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph. If the word “means” appears in a claim element in combination with a function, it is presumed to be a means-plus-function element in which §112, sixth paragraph applies. *Id.* Since “means for” is recited in Means Phrase #1, this step is clearly met.

**Invocation Step 2:**

Second, in accordance with MPEP §2181, the Guidelines, and *Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.*, 250 F.3d 1369, 1376, 58 USPQ2d 1801, 1806 (Fed. Cir. 2001), it is the Examiner’s position that Applicants recite a corresponding function to the means – “receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre.”

The Examiner notes that when determining the function recited “[u]nless something in the written description suggests that the patentee intended the unambiguous language to be construed in a manner inconsistent with its ordinary meaning, we are bound by that language.” *Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom Inc.*, 58 USPQ2d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, the function as found in the Means Phrase #1 will have its ordinary meaning.

**Invocation Step 3:**

Third, in accordance with MPEP §2181, the Guidelines, and *Personalized Media Communications, LLC v. International Trade Commission*, 161 F.3d 696, 704, 48 USPQ2d 1880, 1887 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the means-plus-function clause must not recite sufficient definite structure for performing that function.

In our case, Means Phrase #1 does not recite the structural elements which perform the function. In determining whether the presumption of invocation is rebutted, “the

focus remains on whether the claim... recites sufficiently definite structure.” *Id.* Furthermore, sufficient structure does not require an exhaustive recitation – only structure to perform entirely the claimed function. *Rodime PLC v. Seagate Technology Inc.*, 174 F.3d 1294, 1304, 50 USPQ2d 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Clearly the “receiving at least one order corresponding to a genre” can not be performed by the little if any recited structure in the claim.

Because of the above, it is the Examiner’s position that Means Phrase #1 invokes 35 U.S.C. 112, sixth paragraph.

The Examiner will next apply the above reasoning to all claimed phrases that potentially invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph. Citations and authorities will be omitted for clarity.

### **Means Phrase #2**

It is the Examiner’s position that the “storing means for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order” (“Means Phrase #2” or “MP#2”) invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

Means Phrase #2 meets **Invocation Step 1** because “means for” is recited.

Means Phrase #2 meets **Invocation Step 2** because the phrase recites the function of “storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order.” This function will have its ordinary and plain meaning.

Means Phrase #2 meets **Invocation Step 3** because the claim does not recite sufficient definite structure for performing the function of “storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order.”

### **Means Phrase #3**

It is the Examiner's position that the "managing means for managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre" ("Means Phrase #3" or "MP#3") invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

Means Phrase #3 meets **Invocation Step 1** because "means for" is recited.

Means Phrase #3 meets **Invocation Step 2** because the phrase recites the function of "managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre." This function will have its ordinary and plain meaning.

Means Phrase #3 meets **Invocation Step 3** because the claim does not recite sufficient definite structure for performing the function of "managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre."

### **Means Phrase #4**

It is the Examiner's position that the "reading means for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction" ("Means Phrase #4" or "MP#4") invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

Means Phrase #4 meets **Invocation Step 1** because "means for" is recited.

Means Phrase #4 meets **Invocation Step 2** because the phrase recites the function of “reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction.” This function will have its ordinary and plain meaning.

Means Phrase #4 meets **Invocation Step 3** because the claim does not recite sufficient definite structure for performing the function of “reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction.”

#### **Means Phrase #5**

It is the Examiner’s position that the “arranging means for arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means” (“Means Phrase #5” or “MP#5”) invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

Means Phrase #5 meets **Invocation Step 1** because “means for” is recited.

Means Phrase #5 meets **Invocation Step 2** because the phrase recites the function of “arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means.” This function will have its ordinary and plain meaning.

Means Phrase #5 meets **Invocation Step 3** because the claim does not recite sufficient definite structure for performing the function of “arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means.”

### **Means Phrase #6**

It is the Examiner's position that the "composing means for composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display" ("Means Phrase #6" or "MP#6") invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

Means Phrase #6 meets **Invocation Step 1** because "means for" is recited.

Means Phrase #6 meets **Invocation Step 2** because the phrase recites the function of "composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display." This function will have its ordinary and plain meaning.

Means Phrase #6 meets **Invocation Step 3** because the claim does not recite sufficient definite structure for performing the function of "composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display."

### **Conclusion**

The specification fails to directly disclose what structural elements make up Means Phrases #1-6. In other words, the corresponding structure is not clearly linked in the written description with the required specificity.

**Additional Examiner Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law**

**Additional Examiner Findings of Fact (EFF)**

EFF 1: The Examiner finds that Appellant's petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.181 filed on 30 October 2009, requesting the withdrawal of the objection to the specification set forth in the final rejection mailed on 04 August 2009, has been denied. See Decision on Petition to Withdraw Objections to the Specification under 37 C.F.R. §1.181 mailed on 14 January 2010.

EFF 2: The Examiner finds that the original specification does not provide any lexicographic definitions (either express or implied) of the terms or phrases found in the claims now on appeal.

EFF 3: Appellant expressly states in their 09 May Response, "Specifically, Claim 1 recites means-plus-function features which must be considered in view of 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph." See 09 May Response, p. 7.

EFF 4: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on page 2 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the "Summary of Claimed Subject Matter" section that the "ordering means for receiving at least one order corresponding to the genre" as recited in claim 1 is item **101**. The Examiner finds that the original specification describes item **101** on page 12 as "order accepting part **101**...."

EFF 5: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on page 2 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the "Summary of Claimed Subject Matter" section that the "storing means for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order" as recited in claim 1 is items **58** and **112**. The Examiner finds that the original specification describes items **58** and **112** on page 13 as "storage unit **58**..." and "content data **112**," respectively.

EFF 6: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on pages 2 and 3 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section that the claimed “managing means for managing preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre” as recited in claim 1 is item **102**. The Examiner finds that the original specification describes item **102** on page 13 as “the preference determining part **102**....”

EFF 7: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on page 3 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section that the claimed “reading means for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response in response to an instruction” as recited in claim 1 is item **103**. The Examiner finds that the original specification describes item **103** on page 13 as “the selecting part **103**....”

EFF 8: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on page 3 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section that the claimed “arranging means for arranging said plurality of content data read by said reading means, in accordance with said preference data managed by said managing means” as recited in claim 1 is item **104**. The Examiner finds that the original specification describes item **104** on page 13 as “the sorting part **104**.”

EFF 9: The Examiner finds that Appellant states on page 3 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section that the claimed “composing means for composing said plurality of content data arranged by said arranging means, into a single document including the plurality of content data for display” as recited in claim 1 is item **105**.

The Examiner finds that the original specification describes item 105 on page 13 as “[t]he composing part 105 ....”

EFF 10: The Examiner finds that other sections of the original specification do not further describe or shed light on what specifically constitutes the order accepting part 101, the storage unit 58 and content 112, the preference determining part 102, the selection part 103, the sorting part 104, nor the composing part 105. In particular, the Examiner finds that the original specification does *not* describe—let alone even indicate—a particular algorithm that performs the various phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

EFF 11: The Examiner finds that the section titled “VII. Argument” in the 2009 Appeal Brief does not provide any additional guidance as to what constitutes the corresponding structure for the phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph. In particular, the Examiner finds that the Argument section of the 2009 Appeal Brief also does set forth a particular algorithm that performs the various phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

EFF 12: The Examiner finds that claims 4, 5, and 7-9 recite neither “step for” nor “means for.”

#### ***Additional Examiner Conclusions of Law***

Because claims 4, 5, and 7-9 recite neither “step for” nor “means for,” claims 4, 5, and 7-9 fail Prong (A) as set forth in MPEP §2181 I. Because claims 4, 5, and 7-9 fail Prong (A) as set forth in MPEP §2181 I., the Examiner adopts the presumption (and concludes) that claims 4, 5, and 7-9 do not invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th paragraph. See also *Ex parte Miyazaki*, 89 USPQ2d 1207, 1215-16 (B.P.A.I. 2008)(precedential)(where the Board concluded that because the

phrases at issue did not use “means for” and because appellants had the opportunity to amend the claims to recite “means for” if appellants desired 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th paragraph to be invoked, the claimed phrases at issue did not invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, 6th paragraph.).

### **Arguments which Appellant Could Have Made**

Arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the appeal brief have not been considered by the Examiner and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Moreover, Appellants are given actual notice that any additional arguments that are raised for the first time in the Reply Brief are waived. See *Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A.*, 469 F.3d 978, 989, 80 USPQ2d 1839, 1847-48 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A]n issue not raised by an appellant in its opening brief . . . is waived.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Ex parte Borden IV*, No. 2008-004312, slip op. (BPAI January 7, 2010) (informative)<sup>6</sup>; and *Ex parte Scholl*, No. 2007-3653, slip op. at 18-19 & n.13 (BPAI Mar. 13, 2008) (informative)<sup>7</sup>.

#### **(10) Response to Arguments**

##### **35 U.S.C. §101 Arguments**

###### ***Overview***

It is the Examiner’s principle position that Claims 1-3 and 7-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

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<sup>6</sup> Available at <http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd08004312.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> Available at <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd073653.pdf>

Specifically, claims 1 and 7 recite computer programs *per se*. “Computer programs claimed as computer listings per se, *i.e.*, the descriptions or expressions of the programs, are not physical ‘things.’ They are neither computer components nor statutory processes, as they are not ‘acts’ being performed.” MPEP §2106.01 I.

Additionally, Appellant’s original specification expressly states “[t]he series of steps described above may be executed by suitably functioning hardware or by software. [Emphasis added.]” Specification, p. 31, last line – p. 32, first line. Because the claimed “means” (of claim 1) and “unit[s]” (of claim 7) may be interpreted as software per se, the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of invention. For this reason alone, the 35 U.S.C. §101 rejection should be maintained.

Alternatively, the Examiner notes that using the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unit,” as provided in the Office action mailed on 18 March 2009 (p. 13, ¶ 27dd), the claimed “unit[s]” (of claim 7) are interpreted as software only. Because the broadest reasonable interpretation of “unit” includes software *per se*, the claims are not within one of the four statutory classes of invention and are therefore rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101.

Additionally, with respect to claim 1, the Examiner has concluded that the corresponding structure of the means plus function elements cannot be determined (see 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph rejection above; see also detailed 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph invocation analysis above; and see also detailed arguments below).

***Appellant's Arguments***

With respect to claim 1, Appellant argues:

In the present case, as is noted above in section V, the structure of the means plus function elements of Claim 1 is clearly found in the disclosure as originally filed. Moreover, Applicants note that Figure 3 clearly illustrates the structure of the information processing apparatus recited in Claim 1. Moreover, page 10, line 23, to page 11, line 1 clearly states that the CPU 51 utilizes program code stored in RAM 53 to perform its processes. In other words, the CPU 51 is configured by the program code stored in the RAM 53 to perform certain processes. In support of this position, Applicants note *WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game Technology*, 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999), where the Federal Circuit held that the time domain processing means is a microprocessor programmed to carry out the algorithm. In WMS Gamming, the Federal Circuit noted the statutory requirement to focus on corresponding structure.

See 2009 Appeal Brief, P6 L4-14 (emphasis in original).

First, Appellant contradicts his own findings of “section V” by stating “Figure 3 clearly illustrates the structure of the information processing apparatus recited in Claim 1.” As discussed above, The Examiner has found that the means plus function elements of Claim 1, as described by Appellant in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section, are the order accepting part 101, the storage unit 58 and content 112, the preference determining part 102, the selection part 103, the sorting part 104, and the composing part 105 (see EFF above). The total of these elements are described in Figure 4, *not* Figure 3. In fact, *only* the storage unit 58 is found in both Figures 3 and 4.

Second, it appears that Appellant believes claim 1 is statutory (with respect to §101) based on the “CPU 51” and “RAM 53” as described on pp. 10-11 of the original specification, even though the “CPU 51” and “RAM 53” are *not* what Appellant points to in “section V” as the corresponding structure of the claim elements. Therefore, going on Appellants own summary of

claimed subject matter, the “CPU 51” and “RAM 53” are not elements of claim 1. Accordingly, claim 1 cannot be determined statutory under §101 based on these elements.

Third, Appellant’s reliance on *WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game Technology*, “where the Federal Circuit held that the time domain processing means is a microprocessor programmed to carry out *the algorithm*” (emphasis added), should not be persuasive. As noted above (see EFF), the original specification does not describe—let alone even indicate—a particular algorithm that performs the various phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph. Accordingly, the facts of this case are distinguishable from the facts of *WMS Gaming*.

With respect to claim 1, Appellant argues:

The outstanding Action states that “Applicant’s original specification express states “[t]he series of steps described above may be executed by suitably functioning hardware or by software.” However, the outstanding Action has taken this phrase out of context. Specifically, the next line of the disclosure states “[f]or software-based processing to take place, programs constituting the processing sequences may be either loaded from dedicated hardware of a computer into its internal memory for execution, or installed upon program execution form a suitable program storage medium into a general-purpose personal computer or like equipment capable of executing diverse functions.” Thus, the specification clearly does not indicate that the invention can be performed using software only.

See 2009 Appeal Brief, P6 L15-23.

The Examiner disagrees with Appellant’s assertion that “the next line of the disclosure” shows that the lines of the disclosure relied upon by the Examiner are taken out of context. In fact, it is exactly “the next line of the disclosure” that shows *why* claim 1 is *not* statutory. Claim 1 only recites elements that are equivalent to the “programs constituting the processing sequences” (*i.e.*, the order accepting part 101, the storage unit 58 and content 112, the preference

determining part 102, the selection part 103, the sorting part 104, and the composing part 105).

Claim 1 *does not* recite an element that is equivalent to the “dedicated hardware... for execution” of the programs, nor does claim 1 recite an element that is equivalent to “a general purpose computer” for which the programs are installed and executed.

At best, Appellant’s argument shows that claim 1 is even further *indefinite* for omitting essential structural elements, namely the “dedicated hardware... for execution” of the programs (or “a general purpose computer” for which the programs are installed and executed). See MPEP §2172.01.

With respect to claim 7, Appellants argue:

With regard to Claim 7, Applicants note that this claim is directed to an information processing apparatus which includes at least a management unit implemented using a central processing unit.

See 2009 Appeal Brief, P7 L7-9.

As an initial matter, and with particular attention to “this claim is directed to an information processing apparatus,” the Examiner notes that the recitation of “[a]n information processing apparatus” is *only* in the *preamble* of claims 1 and 7. The preamble of claim 7 (and claim 1, for which this same argument applies) is *not* construed as a limitation because it is not necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. See *Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.*, 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 USPQ2d 1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

Additionally, it is the Examiner’s principle position the central processing unit relied upon by Appellant is interpreted to be outside the scope of claim 7. It is therefore the Examiner’s principle position that Claim 7 does not require a central processing unit (“CPU”) as

a component. Rather, it merely requires a “management unit” that is *implemented* (or executed) using a CPU. The Examiner concedes that each of the units (when interpreted as software *per se*) requires some hardware for *implementation* (e.g., a CPU for *executing* the software units, a mouse, a display, a keyboard, etc.), but that is not to say that each unit then *must* be partly hardware, nor is that a reason to assume that the scope of the claim is anything other than software *per se*. In other words, the recited phrase “implemented using a CPU” is interpreted to be merely a characteristic of the positively recited “management unit.” Accordingly, because the claim recites “a management unit *implemented* using a processing unit,” the claimed management unit is interpreted as a required component, which in turn uses a CPU for implementation purposes (the CPU being outside the scope of the claimed elements; *i.e.*, the CPU is not required for anticipation and/or infringement).

#### **35 U.S.C. §112, Second Paragraph Arguments, in view of 35 U.S.C. §112, Sixth Paragraph**

##### **Overview**

It is the Examiner’s principle position that claims 1-3 are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph because the claim phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph, fail to clearly link and associate the claimed functions to the corresponding structure in the specification.

Based upon a review of Appellant’s original specification, claims, and drawings, Appellant’s 09 May Remarks, and Appellants arguments as set forth in the 2009 Appeal Brief, the Examiner is unable to ascertain the corresponding structure for means plus function phrases.

***Appellant's Inconsistent Arguments as to What Is the Corresponding Structure***

Additionally, the Examiner notes that based upon a review of the prosecution history, Appellant has made inconsistent arguments as to what is (and what is not) the corresponding structure of the means plus function elements.

**Means Phrase #2**

For example, Appellant has made inconsistent arguments as to what constitutes the corresponding structure for the MP#2 (i.e. “storing means for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order” as recited in claim 1). In particular, the prosecution history indicates that Appellant has argued at least 3 mutually exclusive interpretations as to what is the corresponding structure for MP#2.

Initially and in response to the First Non Final Office Action, Appellant, in his 09 May Remarks, states that the corresponding structure includes central processing unit (“CPU”) 11:

A person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize, based on the present specification, that an example of the “means” described in the specification includes the central processing unit 11 of device 2 shown in Applicants’ Fig. 2, and the algorithm executed by the processor. Thus, the claimed “means” is not software per se, but includes the central processing unit and the algorithm.

See 09 May Remarks, P7 L20 to P8, L4.

However later on in the 09 May Remarks, Appellant revises his position on the corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing” and argues that the corresponding structure is only “a hard disk”:

For example, with regard to the storing means for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order, Applicants respectfully submit that the storage means clearly corresponds to the

“storage unit” shown in Figures 2-4 and described on page 11 as formed by a hard disk or the like.

See 09 May Remarks, Pg 8.

Finally and on appeal, Appellant revises the corresponding structure *yet again* and for the first time now states in his “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” (“SCSM”) on page 2 of the 2009 Appeal Brief that the corresponding structure is not only “storage unit” **58**, but also the content data **112**. See footnote 3 in the 2009 Appeal Brief where Appellants expressly state that the corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing” as “Figure 4, items 58 and 112 and page 13, lines 6-9.” The SCSM makes no mention of CPU **11** or any algorithm as originally argued in the 09 May Remarks.

Therefore according to Appellant’s arguments as found in the prosecution history, the corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing” could now be any one of: (1) CPU **11** and “the algorithm”; (2) “storage unit” **58**; or (3) “storage unit” **58** in combination with “content data” **112**.

Appellant is reminded that “[j]ust as prosecution history estoppel may act to estop an equivalence argument under the doctrine of equivalents, positions taken before the PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim construction under §112, ¶ 6.” *Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp.*, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

Because the original specification itself does not state what is the particular corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing,” because Appellants have offered up at least three (3) mutually exclusive positions as to what constitutes the corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing,” and because positions taken

before the PTO may bar an inconsistent position on claim construction under §112, ¶ 6, claim 1 must be considered indefinite because the corresponding structure for MP#2 can not be reasonably determined.

In order to address other arguments in this appeal and because the 2009 Appeal Brief is Appellants latest submission, the Examiner will presume that the SCSM as stated in the 2009 Appeal Brief sets forth Appellants best arguments as to what constitutes the corresponding structure of the means plus function phrases.

***The Specification Does Not Clearly Link and Associate Corresponding Structure to the Claimed Functions***

In particular, the Examiner will show that in claim 1 of the instant application, Appellant has attempted to capture any possible means for achieving the claimed functions by using purely functional claiming.

Claim 1 recites 6 phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112, 6<sup>th</sup> paragraph. While the following analysis applies to *all* phrases that invoke 35 U.S.C. §112 6<sup>th</sup> paragraph, the Examiner will address MP #2 and MP#4 in depth.

**Means Phrase #2**

The Examiner finds that claim 1 recites MF#2 (*i.e.* “storing means for storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order ....”). Based upon the claim language itself and as noted previously, the Examiner concludes that the function of MF#2 is “storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order.”

Additionally and as noted above, “[u]nless something in the written description suggests that the patentee intended the unambiguous language to be construed in a manner inconsistent with its ordinary meaning, we are bound by that language.” *Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom Inc.*, 246 F.3d 1316, 58 USPQ2d 1545, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Because the written description does not suggest otherwise, MF#2 will have its ordinary meaning.

Appellant argues that the corresponding structure of MF#2 is “storage unit” **58** in combination with content data **112**. See footnote 3 on pg 2 in the 2009 Appeal Brief where Appellant expressly states that the corresponding structure for the “storing means for storing” as “Figure 4, items 58 and 112 and page 13, lines 6-9.”

Appellant’s assertion however is technologically not possible since one of ordinary skill in the art recognizes that data can not perform the recited “storing” function. See White’s How Computer’s Work, chapter 14, pp. 140-151. Therefore because content data **112** can not perform the function of “storing a plurality of content data corresponding to the at least one order,” it can not be corresponding structure. In other words, because content data **112** is actually the content data that is being stored, it can not be part of the structure that does the storing. See *Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.*, 325 F.3d 1346, 1352-43, 66 USPQ2d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The signals that are monitored by the ‘means for monitoring’ cannot be part of the structure that does the monitoring.”) citing *O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.*, 115 F.3d 1576, 1581, 42 USPQ2d 1777, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (the passage through which a slug travels “is not the means that causes the passing”).

The Examiner concludes that Appellant’s assertion in the 2009 Appeal Brief that the corresponding structure for the MP#2 (*i.e.* “storing means for storing a plurality of content data

corresponding to the at least one order") is "storage unit" 58 in combination with content data 112 is technologically impossible because data 112 can not perform the claimed function.

Because data 112 can not performed the claimed function, the corresponding structure for MP#2 can not be reasonably determined and the claim is therefore indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 2nd paragraph.

#### Means Phrase #4

##### **Claimed Function**

Based upon the claim language itself, the Examiner concludes that the function of MP #4 is "reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction."

Additionally, "[u]nless something in the written description suggests that the patentee intended the unambiguous language to be construed in a manner inconsistent with its ordinary meaning, we are bound by that language." *Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom Inc.*, 258 USPQ2d at 1550. Because the written description does not suggest otherwise, MF#4 will have its ordinary meaning.

##### **Determining Corresponding Structure**

"The next step is to determine the corresponding structure described in the specification and equivalents thereof. Structure disclosed in the specification is 'corresponding' structure only if the specification or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure

to the function recited in the claim.” *Medtronic, Inc., v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.* 248 F.3d 1303, 1311, 58 USPQ2d 1607, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

“It is well settled that ‘if one employs means-plus-function language in a claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language.’” *Blackboard Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc.*, 91 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2009) quoting *In re Donaldson Co.*, 16 F.3d 1189, 1195, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

“The duty of a patentee to clearly link or associate structure with the claimed function is the quid pro quo for allowing the patentee to express the claim in terms of function under section 112, paragraph 6. Section 112, paragraph 6 was intended to allow the use of means expressions in patent claims without requiring the patentee to recite in the claims all possible structures that could be used as means in the claimed apparatus. However, the price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of the claim to the means specified in the written description and equivalents thereof. If the specification is not clear as to the structure that the patentee intends to correspond to the claimed function, then the patentee has not paid that price but is rather attempting to claim in functional terms unbounded by any reference to structure in the specification. Such is impermissible under the statute.” *Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB*, 68 USPQ2d 1263, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(citations and quotations omitted).

### **Corresponding Structure in a Computer Implemented Invention**

“A general purpose computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm creates ‘a new machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software.’” *WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology*, 184 F.3d 1339, 1348, 51 USPQ2d 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1999) citing *In re Alappat*, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545, 31 USPQ2d 1545, 1558 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (en banc).

In other words, “a computer-implemented means-plus-function claim is limited to a computer programmed to perform the algorithm disclosed in the specification.” *Creo Products Inc. v. Presstek Inc.*, 305 F.3d. 1337, 1345, 64 USPQ2d 1385, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2002) citing *WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech.*, 184 F.3d 1339, 1348, 51 USPQ2d 1385, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In other words, in computer implemented inventions, the corresponding structure is a general purpose computer programmed to carry out an algorithm.

“In cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which the inventor has invoked means-plus-function claiming, this court has consistently required that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general purpose computer or microprocessor. The point of the requirement that the patentee disclose particular structure in the specification and that the scope of the patent claims be limited to that structure and its equivalents is to avoid pure functional claiming. . . . For a patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts to pure functional claiming. Because general purpose computers can be programmed to perform very different tasks in very different

ways, simply disclosing a computer as the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the claim to “the corresponding structure, material, or acts” that perform the function, as required by section 112 paragraph 6.”” *Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty v. Int'l Game Tech.*, 521 F.3d 1328, 86 USPQ2d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(citations and quotations omitted).

“Consequently, a means-plus-function claim element for which the only disclosed structure is a general purpose computer is invalid if the specification fails to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.” *Net MoneyIN v. Verisign*, 88 USPQ2d 1751, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

***Blackboard Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc.***

It is the Examiner’s position that this instant application is similar to the facts as recited in *Blackboard Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc.*, 91 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

In *Blackboard*, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that claim 1 was indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph because the “patent discloses insufficient structure to perform the function of ‘assigning a level of access to and control of each data file based on a user of the system’s predetermined role in a course.’” *Blackboard* at 1493.

Before the district court, Blackboard asserted that the structure that performs the recited “means for assigning” function is “a server computer with an access control manager [ACM] and equivalents thereof.” *Blackboard* at 1490. The Federal Circuit reviewed the specification and noted that the ACM was simply an abstraction that described the claimed function. How the ACM performs the claimed function was not disclosed. “The ACM is

essentially a black box that performs a recited function. But how it does so is left undisclosed.”

Id.

The Federal Circuit next went on to discuss or mention *Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game Technology*, 521 F.3d 1328, 1331,86 USPQ2d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and *Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc.*, 545 F.3d 1359, 88 USPQ2d 1751 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The court also mentioned *Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.*, 523 F.3d 1323, 86 USPQ2d 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

For example, the court in Blackboard noted in that in Net MoneyIn, “[b]ecause there was no disclosed algorithm in that case, we held that the claims were invalid for lack of a sufficient recitation of structure.” *Blackboard* at 1492. The court in *Blackboard* also quoted *Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.*, 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 [86 USPQ2d 1609] (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Simply reciting ‘software’ without providing some detail about the means to accomplish the function is not enough.”).

### **Applying Blackboard to the Instant Application**

As noted above, Appellants state on page 3 in Section V. of the 2009 Brief in the “Summary of Claimed Subject Matter” section that the claimed “reading means for reading said plurality of content data from said storing means in response in response to an instruction” as recited in claim 1 is item 103. The original specification describes item 103 on page 13 as “the selecting part 103....”

Like Blackboard, “selecting part 103” in the instant application does not in any way show *how* the function in MP #4 is performed. As noted in Figure 4 of Appellants’

drawings, “Selecting Part” **103** is literally a box. Like *Blackboard*, Appellants’ specification is completely silent as to how the claimed function is performed. While the box in Appellants description is not ‘a *black* box’ as stated in *Blackboard*, “Selecting Part” **103** is nevertheless just a box.

Additionally, the 2009 Appeal Brief fails to set forth a single algorithm that performs the function as set forth in MP #4, let alone point to an algorithm *in the original specification* that performs that function.

Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded its analysis in *Blackboard* and noted that:

By failing to describe the means by which the access control manager will create an access control list, *Blackboard* has attempted to capture any possible means for achieving that end. Section 112, paragraph 6, is intended to prevent such pure functional claiming.

*Blackboard* at 1493.

Applying this reasoning to the instant application, the Examiner concludes that by failing to describe the means by which selecting part **103** will read said plurality of content data from said storing means in response to an instruction, Appellant has attempted to capture any possible means for achieving that end. As noted in *Blackboard*, section 112, paragraph 6, however is intended to prevent such pure functional claiming.

If Appellant files a Reply Brief in this application and to assist the Board in this appeal, Appellant is strongly encouraged to discuss why the reasoning in *Blackboard*, *Aristocrat*, and *Net MoneyIN* does or does not apply to the instant application.

#### **Other Means Plus Function Phrases**

While the Examiner analyzed Means Phrase #2 and then Means Phrase #4 above, the same analysis applies equally Means Phrase #1, Means Phrase #3, Means Phrase #5, and Means Phrase #6.

#### **35 U.S.C. §112, Second Paragraph Arguments - Hybrid Claims**

The new grounds of rejection under §112 is a **secondary** position against claims 7 and 8. To be especially clear, it is the Examiner's principle position that the claimed "central processing unit" is *not* positively recited, and therefore the claimed "central processing unit" does not cure the deficiencies of claim 7 with respect to §101. See §101 arguments above.

Nevertheless, Appellant now argues "the central processing unit recited in Claim 7 is clearly positively recited." See 2009 Appeal Brief, p. 7, l. 17-18. Even though the Examiner disagrees with Appellant's assertion, if Appellants' arguments were meritorious, claim 7 would then be indefinite because it's a hybrid claim since the claimed "management unit" would be "using a central processing unit." See MPEP §2173.05(p) II., *IPXL v. Amazon*, 430 F3d 1377, 77 USPQ 2d 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2005). See also discussion under the New Grounds of Rejection

above.

**Prior Art Arguments**

**Overview**

It is the Examiner's principle position that claims 1, 3-5, 7, and 9, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Kent, in view of Nii.

**Appellant Groups Independent Claims 1, 4, 5, and 7**

Appellant's arguments against the rejection under §103 are presented on pp. 9-11 of the 2009 Appeal Brief. Appellant addresses the alleged patentable features of claim 1 in detail and does not address any alleged patentable features of independent claims 4, 5, and 7 in separate arguments. Rather, Appellant argues that claims 4, 5, and 7 are patentable for reasons *similar* to the reasons for claim 1 (see 2009 Appeal Brief, p. 11, l. 15-16).

Because claims 4, 5, and 7 are not argued separately, claims 4, 5, and 7 will stand or fall with the patentability of claim 1.

Because Appellant only argues claim 1, and because Appellant does not present separate arguments for claims 4, 5, and 7, the Examiner will only address claim 1 for prior art purposes.

**Claim 1 – Primary Position for Rejection under §103**

As an initial matter, the Examiner has determined that Appellant attempts to claim a machine in claim 1. See e.g., section VII. A. of the 2009 Appeal Brief, in which Appellant attempts to show that claim 1 is directed to a machine. Moreover, and as discussed above, claim

1 recites six means-plus-function elements that have been interpreted under 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph.

It is well known for a machine claim, if a limitation of the claim invokes 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph, it must be interpreted to cover the corresponding structure in the specification and “equivalents thereof.” See 35 U.S.C. §112, sixth paragraph. See also *B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Lab.*, 124 F.3d 1419, 1424, 43 USPQ2d 1896, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Because claim 1 is an attempt to claim a machine, and because the elements of claim 1 invoke §112, sixth paragraph, claim 1 must be interpreted to cover the corresponding structure in the specification and “equivalents thereof.”

In the rejection above, the Examiner has interpreted claim 1 to cover the corresponding structure in the specification and “equivalents thereof.” However, as discussed above, the corresponding structure cannot be determined, and therefore an accurate comparison of the claimed invention to the prior art is impossible at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). On this basis alone, claim 1 is not distinguishable over the prior art. This is the Examiner’s primary position and the rejection under §103 should be sustained on this basis alone.

#### **Claim 1 – Alternative Position for Rejection under §103**

Despite the Examiner’s primary position, as outlined above, and as mirrored in the Examiner’s numerous Office actions prior to the 2009 Appeal Brief, the Examiner has applied the prior art to claim 1 despite its deficiencies. This is an alternative position, but in accordance

with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO's policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though a claim is indefinite, the Examiner has construed the claims and has applied the prior art as much as practically possible. To do this, the Examiner searched the prior art for the functions claimed in claim 1 and applied the *structure* of the prior art performing these functions as an equivalent to the *structure* missing in Appellant's specification.

In Appellant's 2009 Appeal Brief, Appellant is now arguing that the prior art does not disclose the *functions* of claim 1 in an attempt to show that the prior art does not disclose the corresponding *structure*, which of course cannot even be determined at this time. As a matter of law, the *functions* cannot distinguish claim 1 over the prior art, instead it is the *structure* corresponding to the functions that is weighed for patentability. Regardless, in the case where the Board disagrees with this analysis, the Examiner will address the Appellant's arguments for the *function* and show where the functions are disclosed in the prior art.

With respect to claim 1, Appellant argues:

However, the combination of Kent and Nii does not describe or suggest managing, using the information processing apparatus, preference data by which to determine preferences based on a quantity of previous orders, each order corresponding to a genre and arranging, using the information processing apparatus, said plurality of content data read in said reading, in accordance with said preference data managed in said managing, as is recited in Claim 1.

See 2009 Appeal Brief, P10 L3-8 (emphasis in original).

The Examiner respectfully disagrees. First, Appellants do not dispute the *combination of Kent and Nii*.

Second, and as cited in the rejection above, Kent's "automatic personalization software program 100," as described by Kent in at least ¶¶ 0055, 0062, and 0065-0068, clearly performs managing preference data ("data for the automatic profiling function of the present invention")

by which to determine preferences based on previous orders (*e.g.*, “downloaded files” and “credit card purchase”), each order corresponding to a genre (at least downloaded files would *inherently* have a corresponding genre (*i.e.*, “a type or class”), as provided in the Office action mailed on 18 March 2009). Therefore, the corresponding *structure* in the prior art that performs the “managing...” is the “automatic personalization software program 100.”

Third, Kent’s “profiling program 132,” as described by Kent in at least ¶¶ 0077-0079, clearly performs arranging said plurality of content data read in said reading, in accordance with said preference data managed in said managing. First, the “optimization program 48” performs the reading (¶ 0079, “a database of content 160... is created and accessed by the optimization program 48”), then after the database is read by the “optimization program 48,” Kent goes on to describe the selection of the content by the “profiling program 132” (“the profiling program 132... to select the most relevant content in the content database 160 for the particular subscriber, based on the ‘profile’ of the subscriber...”). In view of Kent’s description of content selection based on user parameters in ¶ 0078, the Examiner interprets Kent’s selecting of content to be analogous to the claimed “arranging” (see Kent, at least ¶ 0078, “[t]he values... determine the resulting *prioritization* of the content” (emphasis added)). Clearly, the performance of the reading and selecting by the “optimization program 48” and “profiling program 132” results in a prioritized arrangement (*i.e.*, “arranging”) of content based on the user’s profile. Accordingly, the corresponding *structure* in the prior art that performs the “reading...” and “arranging...” is the “optimization program 48” and “profiling program 132.”

Finally, the only difference between the claimed invention and Kent is that Kent's software program 100 does not determine preferences based specifically on a *quantity* of previous orders.

Nii, in a related endeavor, discloses a method of and a system for distributing electronic content. In Nii's method, Nii teaches "a tailoring parameters register" by which to determine preferences ("tailorization parameters") based on a quantity of previous orders ("list of previous items purchased"), each order corresponding to a genre (¶¶ 0024, 0027, 0072, 0075, and 0079). In Nii the preferences are used for "tailorization of the content to be delivered on a terminal per terminal basis," where "information to be delivered to that particular terminal is tailored in accordance with the preferences, settings, etc."

Nii's system also performs *arranging* said plurality of content data in accordance with said preference data managed in said managing (see at least fig. 1, depiction of content arranged numerically for user to select).

Accordingly, every *structural element* (as best understood by the Examiner) corresponding to the argued *functions* have been shown in the prior art. For this second reason, the rejection under §103 should be sustained.

#### **Official Notice Arguments**

With respect to claims 2 and 8, Appellant argues:

Moreover, Applicants note that the features disclosed in Claims 2 and 8 are not are not capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being well-known. As is noted in MPEP §2144.03, "it is never appropriate to rely solely on "common knowledge" in the art without evidentiary support in the record, as the principal evidence upon which a rejection was based. *Zurko*, 258 F.3d at 1385, 59 USPQ2d at 1697."

See 2009 Appeal Brief, P11, L22-26.

From the reply above, Appellants are challenging the official notice made in the non-final office action. This issue is of particular importance to the USPTO Patent Examining Corp because examiners frequently receive Board decisions where the Board improperly addresses official notice arguments.

**Examiner's Response**

**Summary of the Examiner's Response:**

The Examiner's position was summarized in the decision of *In re Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d 1866 (Comm'r Pat. 1987) where the Deputy Commissioner stated “[i]t is totally contrary to the orderly prosecution of patent applications to withhold arguments relating to patentability from the examiner and then present them for the first time to the board.” *Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d at 1872.

**Additional Findings of Fact:**

The Examiner finds that Appellant is now (on appeal) seeking reconsideration of the officially noticed statements made in the non final office action.<sup>8</sup> See Appellant's 2009 Appeal Brief pg 11, section "D." In other words, the Examiner finds that Appellant is for the *very first time* challenging, in the 2009 Appeal Brief, the Examiner's officially noticed statements made in the non final office action.

The Examiner finds that the Officially Noticed statements were present in the non-final office action. See Paper No. 20090305, page 11, ¶22 and ¶22(bb.).

The Examiner finds that the same Officially Noticed statements were also present in the final office action. See Paper No. 20090723, page 8, ¶27 as "Applicant's Own Admission").<sup>9</sup>

The Examiner finds that Appellant did not mention, let alone *adequately traverse*, the officially noticed statements in their reply of 19 May 2009.

The Examiner finds that actual notice was given to Appellant in the final office action that he did not *adequately traverse* the officially noticed statements in his reply of 19 May 2009. See Paper No. 20090723, page 18, ¶56 and ¶57.

Because Appellant did not mention, let alone adequately traverse, the officially noticed statements in their reply of 19 May 2009, the Examiner concluded in the final office action that Appellant failed to traverse the officially noticed statements. The Examiner also stated in the final office action at ¶56 and ¶57 that because Appellants did not traverse the official noticed

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<sup>8</sup> The non final office action is assigned Paper No. 20090305 and mailed 18 March 2009.

<sup>9</sup> The final office action is assigned Paper No. 20090723 and mailed 4 August 2009.

statements, “the Official Notice statements from Paper No 20090305 ¶23 bb are taken to be admitted prior art. See MPEP 2144.03.”

**Board Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction On Traversal of Official Notice**

It is the Examiner’s principle position that because Appellant did not traverse the officially noticed statements in his 19 May 2009 response in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(b), Applicant is *not* entitled to reconsideration. Because Applicant is not entitled to reconsideration of this issue, the Board does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of Appellant’s position on Official Notice. In particular, the Board does not have subject matter jurisdiction on this issue because Appellant has either (1) waived this issue because Appellant is not entitled to reconsideration or (2) abandoned his application. See *In re Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d 1866 (ComrPats 1987). To support the Examiner’s position, the Examiner notes the following:

Initially, the Examiner recognizes that a patent applicant has the right to challenge or not challenge an issue presented by an examiner in an office action. Applying this to official notice, a patent applicant clearly has the right to traverse or not traverse an officially noticed statement.

Additionally, 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) begins “In order to be entitled to reconsideration or further examination, the applicant [] must reply to the Office action. The reply by the applicant [] must be reduced to a writing which distinctly and specifically points out the supposed errors in the examiner’s action . . . [Emphasis added.]”

Thus, if a patent applicant desires *not* to have an issue reconsidered (*i.e.* if the patent applicant desires to waive a particular issue), the patent applicant is *not* required to point out the

supposed errors in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Applying this to official notice, if a patent applicant desires *not* to have an officially noticed statement reconsidered but instead desires to waive his or her traversal of official notice, the patent applicant is *not* required to point out the supposed errors in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Prosecution of the patent application would nevertheless continue.

Conversely, should a patent applicant desire to have a particular issue reconsidered, 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) *requires* the patent applicant to specifically point out the supposed errors in their next response. *Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d at 1870-71. Again applying this to official notice, should a patent applicant desire to have an officially noticed statement reconsidered, 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) *requires* the patent applicant to adequately traverse the official noticed statements by specifically traversing the supposed errors in the patent applicant's next response.

The Examiner found (as noted above) that Appellant is seeking reconsideration of the officially noticed statements made in the non final office action. Because Appellant is seeking reconsideration of the officially noticed statements made in the non final office action, 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) required Appellant to traverse the official noticed statements in his 19 May 2009 response. However as noted above, Appellant clearly elected not to traverse the officially noticed statements.

The Examiner notes that patent examiners have no authority to waive 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). *Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d at 1871 noting the examiners have no authority to waive 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). Additionally, 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) applies equally to the Board because the

Board judges (as examiners-in-chief), may examine or reexamine claims.<sup>10</sup> Because Appellant is seeking reconsideration of the officially noticed statements made in the non final office action, the issue becomes: did Appellant's 19 May 2009 response comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b)?

In *Goodman*, the Commissioner noted that "the rule makes it plain that any response must clearly point out the purported errors in the examiner's action. The penalty for failing to do so may be abandonment of the application." *Goodman*, 3 USPQ2d at 1868.

As noted above, Appellant's 19 May 2009 response did not even *attempt* to traverse the officially noticed statement. As such, Appellant can not be entitled to reconsideration.

Alternatively, applying 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) to this application and assuming Appellant continues to seek reconsideration of the officially noticed statements, this application is, as a matter of law, now abandoned.

Thus, as a matter of law, the *only* way to save this application from abandonment is to conclude that Appellant does not desire to challenge the officially noticed statements made in the non-final office action. In other words, to prevent abandonment, the Examiner must conclude that Appellant has waived his challenge of the officially noticed statements. Therefore if Appellant does not desire to challenge the officially noticed statements made in the non-final office action (*i.e.* if Appellant has waived his traversal of the officially noticed statements), the Board *does* have jurisdiction of this application and can then proceed to decide this appeal on the merits.

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<sup>10</sup> "The members of the Board of Appeals are denominated 'examiners-in-chief' in both 35 U.S.C. 3 ('Officers and employees') and 35 U.S.C. [§ 6]. The title chosen by the Congress implies that the members of the board have authority to *examine or reexamine* appealed claims. [Emphasis in original]." *In re Loehr*, 500 F.2d 1390, 1392-93, 183 USPQ 56, 58 (CCPA 1974).

**Examiner's Recommendation**

The Examiner hereby recommends that the Board find that Appellant has *waived* his traversal of the officially noticed statements. In other words, Appellants are not entitled to reconsideration of his traversal of the officially noticed statements. Thus the officially noticed statements are admitted prior art.

**Conclusion of Officially Notice Arguments**

In conclusion, it is the Examiner's principle position that Appellant has *waived* his ability to traverse the officially noticed statements. The Board may then proceed to decide this appeal on the merits.

Alternatively, if the Board concludes that Appellant has *not* waived his traversal of the officially noticed statements or if the Board desires to address Appellant's traversal of the official notice arguments on the merits, the Board does not have subject matter jurisdiction because this application is considered abandoned. If the Board chooses the later, the Examiner respectfully requests the Board to *remand* this application to the Examiner with instructions to indicate abandonment of this application as of 18 June 2009 (3 months after the mailing date of the non-final office action)<sup>11</sup> for failure to comply with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b). While the Examiner recognizes that the remand and abandonment may seem quite severe, the Board has no choice since, as a matter of law, the Board can not act on an abandoned application.

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<sup>11</sup> **Error! Main Document Only.** “[T]he date of abandonment is after midnight of the date the period for reply actually expired. This is normally the end of the 3-month shortened statutory period.” MPEP §711.04(a).

**(11) Related Proceeding(s) Appendix**

No decision rendered by a court or the Board is identified by the examiner in the Related Appeals and Interferences section of this examiner's answer.

For the above reasons, it is believed that the rejections should be sustained.

This Examiner's answer contains a new ground of rejection set forth in section (9) above. Accordingly, Appellant must within **TWO MONTHS** from the date of this answer exercise one of the following two options to avoid *sua sponte* **dismissal of the appeal** as to the claims subject to the new ground of rejection:

**(1) Reopen prosecution.** Request that prosecution be reopened before the primary examiner by filing a reply under 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 with or without amendment, affidavit or other evidence. Any amendment, affidavit or other evidence must be relevant to the new grounds of rejection. A request that complies with 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(b)(1) will be entered and considered. Any request that prosecution be reopened will be treated as a request to withdraw the appeal.

**(2) Maintain appeal.** Request that the appeal be maintained by filing a reply brief as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.41. Such a reply brief must address each new ground of rejection as set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) and should be in compliance with the other requirements of 37 CFR 41.37(c). If a reply brief filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(b)(2) is accompanied by any amendment, affidavit or other evidence, it shall be treated as a request that prosecution be reopened before the primary examiner under 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(b)(1).

Extensions of time under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) are not applicable to the TWO MONTH time period set forth above. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(b) for extensions of time to reply for patent

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applications and 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c) for extensions of time to reply for ex parte reexamination proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

/JACOB C. COPPOLA/  
Examiner, Art Unit 3621  
August 5, 2010

/ANDREW J. FISCHER/  
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3621

Conferees:

/A. J. F./  
Andrew J. Fischer  
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3621

Vincent Millin /vm/  
Appeals Conference Specialist, TC 3600

**A Technology Center Director or designee must personally approve the new ground of rejection set forth in section (9) above by signing below:**

/Beth V. Boswell/ for Wynn Coggins

Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3623